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This paper examines characteristics of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies 
(SPACs) as determinants of post-acquisition success. I collected data on all SPACs which 
merged with a target firm between 2016 and the start of 2021. The data set controls for a 
host of variables including the contractual design of the SPAC, management team 
characteristics, founder compensation structure, key underwriter data, and performance 
metrics measured throughout the SPAC’s lifecycle. Using a multivariable regression, I 
find new and robust insights into the SPAC market. Contrary to current literature, I 
conclude that the misaligned incentives caused by the initial at-risk capital supplied by 
founders are overstated. Additionally, I find evidence that underwriter characteristics are 
declining in importance as more institutional investors enter the SPAC market. Finally, I 
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 Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, or SPACs, have experienced 
tremendous growth over the past year, transitioning from a niche financial instrument 
into the hottest commodity on Wall Street. Simply put, SPACs are blank check 
companies which exist as an alternative to the traditional IPO process. They raise capital 
through an IPO which is then used to merge with a private company, thereby taking it 
public. Shareholders who do not approve of a proposed merger can choose to redeem 
their shares in exchange for their full investment plus interest. If a SPAC fails to merge 
with a target company within two years, it liquidates and returns capital to shareholders. 
Once considered a “back-door” to public markets, the spotlight has suddenly been shone 
on SPACs. Success stories of firms like Draft Kings (DKNG) providing shareholders 
with impressive returns after going public via SPAC in 2020 created a favorable shift in 
market sentiment, resulting in an extraordinary volume of new entrants into public 
markets. As seen in Figure I.1, 2020 SPAC IPO proceeds were nearly double the entire  
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seven preceding years combined. Only four months into 2021, SPAC IPO proceeds have 
already surpassed those record setting figures and outpaced traditional IPOs by a wide 
margin.  
Despite the media hype, research on the determinants of post-acquisition 
performance remains sparse. Unlike traditional firms, SPACs do not have operations or a 
business model which can be used to predict success. Instead, a SPAC’s only assets are the 
human capital of its management team and the capital raised through the IPO. Investors 
are therefore faced with high levels of uncertainty when projecting the prospects of a 
SPAC. Cummings (2014) compared this process to “betting on a jockey.” This paper 
attempts to reduce the uncertainty by examining success factors of post-acquisition SPACs 
using a host of variables regressed against post-acquisition share price growth.  
Past research has criticized SPACs for their structure which creates misaligned 
incentives and substantial costs (Klausner, 2020); however, an empirical study focused on 
post-acquisition performance has not been undertaken. The lack of research combined with 
the continued flood of SPACs into public equity markets makes it increasingly important 
to analyze the structure, history, and drivers behind SPAC success. While my study 
provided many insights, three standout: first, contrasting previous research on perverse 
incentives, at-risk capital supplied by founders was shown to have a positive and significant 
effect on share price growth; second, there is new evidence suggesting that characteristics 
of SPAC underwriters are declining in importance as more underwriters enter the SPAC 
market; finally, share redemption rates were found to be highly variable across the SPAC 
sample and had a negative, significant effect on post-merger SPAC performance. In my 
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thesis, I will first provide insight into the structure and history of the blank check firms. I 
will then discuss the existing literature before showcasing my methodology and results. 
II. SPAC Background 
 
II.1 SPAC Structure 
At their core, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies are an investment vehicle 
which provide private firms an alternative route to public markets. Founders, or sponsors, 
pool capital together for the sole purpose of taking a private firm public. At this point, they 
have no business operations and do not have an acquisition target. The SPAC then raises 
additional capital from institutional investors through an IPO. Typically, 85% to 100% of 
IPO proceeds enter a trust which can only be used for an acquisition (Jenkinson and Sousa, 
2009). During the SPAC’s life, the trust earns interest by investing in short term US 
government securities. The remaining IPO proceeds and startup capital from founders are 
used to cover the underwriter fees, IPO expenses, and working capital. 
Instead of receiving a salary, SPAC founders are compensated with a significant 
equity stake purchased at a nominal price prior to the IPO. This block of shares is 
commonly called the “promote” and typically equates to 25% of IPO proceeds or 20% of 
shares outstanding. These shares are placed into an escrow account and are subject to 
transfer restrictions and anti-dilution mechanisms. Restrictions often include a lock-up 
period of up to one year after the business combination with exceptions if shares break a 
specified price threshold. 
 The SPAC founders have a two-year window after the IPO to complete an 
acquisition. If this deadline is not met, the trust account is liquidated and returned to public 
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shareholders. Assuming a firm is identified, an announcement is made and shareholders 
vote to approve the deal. If shareholders do not approve of the acquisition, they can redeem 
their shares in exchange for their initial investment plus interest. Founders, however, are 
unable to participate in any liquidation meaning that they end up with nothing if they fail 
to complete a deal. Oftentimes, liquidated shares are replaced through a private investment 
in public equity, or PIPE, to ensure a deal is completed. Once a deal is completed, SPAC 
shares are converted into shares of the new combined firm.  Figure II.1 illustrates the SPAC 
lifecycle.  
 
Figure II.1 - The SPAC Lifecycle  
 
II.2 History 
SPACs have only recently entered the mainstream, but the earliest iteration in the 
United States can be traced back to 1993. Following the 1987 stock market crash, the SEC 
implemented Rule 419 which was designed to give additional protection to public investors 
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from blank-check penny stock companies. SPACs soon followed to circumvent the new 
restrictions put in place. Since SPACs operated outside of the SEC’s new regulation, 
Murray (2017) argues that they have been able to undergo change and evolution more 
swiftly, leading to an investment vehicle that can quickly adapt to volatile market 
conditions. Recent changes include removing share redemption thresholds and allowing 
for share trading after the merger vote, which essentially provides investors with 100% 
downside protection. These changes have played a vital role in making SPACs an attractive 
option for both founders and institutional investors. In the following section, I discuss the 
SPAC literature and theory which shaped my empirical model. 
III. Literature Review 
 
III.1 SPAC Sponsor Incentives 
A criticism consistently leveled against SPACs is the misaligned sponsor incentives 
influenced by the current deal structuring. As mentioned in the previous section, founders 
are compensated with the promote which typically equates to 20% of the outstanding 
shares. This has made SPAC management a highly lucrative and attractive position. In a 
2007 study performed by Jog and Son, the median return for the founders of a successfully 
merged SPAC equated to 1,900%. If a merger does not occur, however, the SPAC is 
liquidated, and the founders lose their entire investment. Therefore, SPAC sponsors are 
heavily incentivized to complete a deal regardless of the underlying quality of the target 
firm (Jog and Son 2007). Later studies by Berger (2008) and Jenkinson et al (2011) 
solidified the validity of Jog & Son’s findings.  These incentive issues are thought to be 
made worse by the start-up capital supplied by founders. This investment is devoid of 
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redemption rights and is therefore referred to as “at-risk”. Klausner (2020) argues that 
higher levels of at-risk capital will widen the gap between founder and shareholder 
motivations. 
In addition to being the root of unbalanced incentives, the promote paid to sponsors 
causes significant share dilution and decreases shareholder value. In effect, the promote 
acts as a tax on a SPAC’s merger. Klausner (2020) concluded that, of the SPACs which 
successfully merged between 2019-2020, the median net promote as a percentage of post-
merger equity was 7.7%. In order for the acquisition to be a value increasing transaction, 
the merger must generate a surplus greater than the inherent dilution within the SPAC’s 
structure.  
 
III.2 The Role of Institutional Investors and Share Redemptions 
SPACs have been described by some as a poor man's private equity, allowing 
average retail investors an opportunity to bet on a sponsors’ skills in identifying and 
merging with a high potential private firm. From this perspective, SPACs can be viewed 
as a democratizing force within financial markets. Klausner (2020), however, argued that 
the role of institutional investors is often understated. In his study based on the 46 SPACs 
which merged from January 1st, 2019 to June 30th, 2020, he revealed that the median 
ownership by 13F filers during this period is 87% of pre-merger SPAC shares. It can be 
inferred from this figure that SPACs have not given the average retail investor a seat at the 
table.  
Given that institutional investors hold most of the pre-merger shares, it is important 
to understand how these firms view their positions. One may be inclined to believe that 
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institutional investors trust in the ability of the sponsors and plan to hold onto their shares 
through the merger. Of the 2019-20 cohort of merged SPACs researched by Klausner 
(2020), however, the mean redemption rate equated to 58%. Despite these high rates of 
redemption, mergers were still completed due to growth of PIPE financing available to 
SPACs. In this sample, 77% of SPACs raised additional capital at the time of their mergers. 
After share redemptions, there is an average of 42% of the original shares 
outstanding. At first glance, these unredeemed shares appear to be instances where 
investors expressed confidence in the proposed deal and held onto their shares. Klausner 
(2020) attempted to investigate this by analyzing the divestment rate of 13F shareholders. 
Divestment can be considered either a redemption or sale of shares starting from the merger 
announcement until just before the merger closes. From their analysis, it was discovered 
that the mean SPAC divestment rate stood at 90% for SPACs merged in 2019, indicating 
that IPO investors choose to redeem or divest their shares regardless of the target 
companies’ outlook. Therefore, a high rate of redemption seems to be an industry standard 
rather than a predictor of a target companies’ future success. Questions remain about the 
long-term validity of these insights and their impact on post-acquisition performance. 
Klausner’s study only observed SPACs which merged in 2019. By observing a longer 
period, I seek to gain a better understanding of the impact that institutional investors and 
share redemptions have on SPAC mergers.  
 
III.3 Characteristics of SPAC Success 
Research on the underlying drivers of a successful SPAC is quite sparse, however, 
Cumming’s (2014) study successfully laid out an economic model and methodology to 
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investigate. It applied a logit model to comprehensively analyze the success factors for 
their dependent variable: acquisition approval. Their sample consisted of all completed 
SPACs listed on U.S. stock exchanges between 2003 and 2010. This sample included 163 
SPACs, ninety-eight of which successfully completed an acquisition. The study utilized 
twenty-three explanatory variables combined into four separate sections: SPAC Structure, 
IPO Process, Ownership Structure, and Operations and Performance. Interestingly, the data 
indicates that more experienced managers and boards do not enhance the probability of 
deal approval. Additionally, it was found that more prestigious underwriters and large 
underwriter syndicates adversely affect the chances of an acquisition target being approved 
(Cummings et al, 2014). 
Cumming’s research was foundational in understanding the drivers behind SPAC 
acquisition approval. To be applicable in 2020, however, the methodology must be updated 
to encompass the drastic variations that the SPAC market has undergone. For instance, 
acquisition approval is no longer a valid metric for success given the drastic decline in 
liquidation rates caused by the growth of PIPE investments and the removal of redemption 
thresholds. Cumming’s sample had a liquidation rate of 40% in comparison to a 2% 
liquidation rate in 2019. Additionally, investors looking to hold their shares through a 
SPAC merger will be unable to derive insights from Cumming’s research. In this paper, I 
shift my attention towards post-merger stock performance to understand how SPAC 








The purpose of my research is to understand success factors determining positive 
returns following a SPAC acquisition. To do so, I analyze share price growth over a 
specified trading period. Murray (2017) argues that SPACs have been continuously 
evolving and adapting to changing market conditions. This suggests that newer SPACs will 
provide more relevant results. Additionally, SPAC acquisitions showed steady growth 
starting in 2016 prior to the SPAC boom witnessed in 2020, indicating a favorable swing 
in market sentiment toward SPACs as a method of reaching public markets. To capture the 
latest trends in SPACs, I have focused my study on SPACs which completed a deal after 
January 1st, 2016. My primary sample measures share price growth over a 365-day trading 
window. SPACs which closed a deal after January 1st, 2016 and prior to April 30th, 2020 
were eligible for the sample. To capture price movement as the deal approaches 
completion, I chose to begin the trading window 30-days prior to the acquisition date.  
I utilized the investment database “SPAC Research” to identify all relevant 
offerings. Results were then confirmed through the investment database “SPAC Track” 
and the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering and Retrieval (EDGAR) database. There was a 
total of ninety-one SPACs who completed their life cycle as blank check companies and 
either liquidated or acquired a company during this time frame. Eleven SPACs failed to 
combine with a target firm and have thus been excluded from the dataset, leaving eighty 
SPACs who successfully completed their acquisition. A further five SPACs have been 
excluded from the sample. The first successfully combined with a target company; 
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however, the firm waived the closing conditions under the merger agreement which would 
have required common stocks and warrants to be listed on the NASDAQ. The second was 
the subject of an additional acquisition nine months after its initial combination. The final 
three were delisted during the 365-day trading window leaving a sample of 75 SPACs. To 
ensure my results are robust and valid, I also created samples which measured share price 
growth over a 180-day and 90-day trading period. This reduced trading window allowed 
me to include additional SPACs to the sample from the latter stages of 2020 and the start 
of 2021. The 180-day and 90-day samples contains 101 and 130 total SPACs, respectively. 
Table IV.1 provides a breakdown of SPACs included in each sample by year. For all three 
samples, I collected data across three different types: structural SPAC data, IPO process 
data, and performance data. The following section provides detail on the sources and 





Table IV.1 – SPACs Included in Each Sample by Year 




IV.1.1 Structural SPAC Data 
 Structural SPAC data includes the contractual design of the offering, leadership 
information, and incentive structure. Most of this information was compiled through the 
investing databases “SPAC Research” and “SPAC Track” alongside audited filings from 
SEC EDGAR. All SPACS are required to submit form 424 to the SEC in accordance with 
the Securities Act of 1933 (Heyman 2007). I leveraged these public filings to obtain reliable 
information on key components of my SPACs of interest to be used in my analysis. 
Primarily, these filings were used to gather data on SPAC managers. All managers listed 
within form 424 were included in the total managers variable and their ages were averaged 
to create the team age variable. In this study, average team age is used as a proxy for 
experience. 
Table IV.2 – Variable Definitions 
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  In addition to pulling data from SEC filings, the vetted forms allowed me to validate 
information from my investing databases. Trust value, IPO units, at-risk capital, and 
promote shares were exported from the archived database and at-risk capital database 
found on SPAC Research. The trust value variable measures the total IPO proceeds placed 
into the escrow account after the IPO in millions of dollars. The IPO shares variable 
measures the total public shares outstanding directly after the IPO. At-risk capital measures 
the initial funds provided by the founders in millions of dollars. If the SPAC were to fail 
to make a business combination, the at-risk capital would not be returned to the founders 
as it is devoid of redemption rights. The promote shares variable measures the total shares 
awarded to founders after the business combination is completed. I divided the promote 
shares by the total IPO shares to normalize the data across all SPACs. This variable is used 
to understand the underlying incentive issues derived from the compensation structure for 
sponsors. For variables not easily exportable, I created a web scraper which was able to 
automate the data pulling process and eliminate manual errors. Finally, to obtain the 
expertise dummy variable, I manually cross-referenced manager names from form 424 
with the “SPAC Research” directors database. 1 is used to denote SPACs with a manager 
who had successfully completed two or more business combinations in their history and 0 
otherwise. This dummy variable is used as a proxy for management’s expertise and 
understanding of the SPAC industry.  
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Tables IV.3 and IV.4 contain structural data statistics for the one-year and 90-day 
samples respectively. The 90-day sample allowed for an additional 55 observations from 
the latter stages of 2020 and the start of 2021 and will thus provide insight into how SPACs 
have continued to develop when compared to the 365-day sample. Trust value in the 365-
day sample has a mean value of $265 million and a standard deviation of $198.09 million 
indicating that SPACs continue to be highly differentiated in size. Despite promote shares 
being negotiable, the promote to IPO shares ratio has a standard deviation of 0.02 
indicating that SPAC founders have historically received relatively uniform payouts across 
all SPACs. This lack of variance may minimize the insights into the misaligned incentives 




Table IV.3 – Structural SPAC Data Summary Statistics – One-Year Sample  
Table IV.4 – Structural SPAC Data Summary Statistics – 90-Day Sample  
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Trust value, number of managers, experience, expertise, and at-risk capital all had 
relatively small increases after including the additional observations from the 90-day 
sample (+1.5%, +0.2%, +0.1%, +3.3%, and +1.0% respectively). The promote to IPO 
shares ratio, however, declined by -1.0%. The lack of significant change between the two 
samples indicates that as SPAC boom continued through 2020, little evolution occurred in 
SPAC structure. 
   
IV.1.2 IPO Process Data 
IPO process data provides essential descriptive statistics on the SPAC IPO backers. 
This data was scraped from SPAC Research through a channel of archival data on historic 
SPAC underwriters. This dataset is given by annual panel data which I then aligned with 
my structural SPAC data by year and underwriter. I was able to obtain data on the ranking 
of underwriters based on total bookrunner volume as well as the total number of 
underwriters backing a given SPAC. Examining the groups underwriting these SPACs will 
allow my model to make predictions about how SPACs will perform based upon the total 
volume in millions of dollars underwritten by the backer. Of particular interest in my 
analysis is the phenomenon of “serial underwriting”, a case where one backer is behind an 
extremely high volume of SPACs. By analyzing this group compared with low volume 
backers, I can develop insights into underwriter incentives. We might expect that serial 
underwriters back SPACs for the underwriting commission and fees associated with the 
IPO rather than their expectations about company potential. Tables IV.5 and IV.6 contain 





IV.1.3 Performance Data 
  Performance data includes variables which fluctuate during the SPAC’s lifecycle 
and can be used as a benchmark for manager performance. Primarily, this data was scraped 
from the archival database found on SPAC Research. The days searching variable was 
calculated by finding the difference between the IPO date and the date the deal was 
finalized. This variable allows for an analysis of SPAC managers ability to find a target 
company quickly and close the deal. I expect that post acquisition performance will fall as 
days searching approaches the two-year liquidation deadline. To not lose out on the 
promote, managers will be motivated to push through a deal regardless of the quality of the 
target firm. Redemption rate measures the percent of shares redeemed for cash from the 
trust value throughout the SPAC’s lifecycle. Despite Klausner’s (2020) argument that 
public investors divest their shares regardless of the potential outlook of the target firm, I 
expect that redemption rate should give a measure of the shareholder’s trust in 
Table IV.5 – IPO Process Data Summary Statistics – One-Year Sample  
Table IV.6 – IPO Process Data Summary Statistics – 90-Day Sample  
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management. The implied pro forma enterprise value is calculated at the time of deal close 
and pulled from the 8-K merger announcement. This value was then divided by trust value 
to normalize across all observations. Principally, this variable will allow for an analysis of 
management’s ability to find a favorable deal for shareholders. I expect there will be a 
positive effect on post-acquisition performance the more enterprise value outweighs trust 
value.    
For my dependent variable, I have chosen to analyze the growth rate of share price. 
Studies in the past have largely focused their attention on the acquisition itself, however, 
this provides little insight for investors looking for long term returns on their SPAC 
investment. Using a price growth rate provides a more powerful indicator of a SPAC’s 
success in current analysis, because it can directly chart a firm’s performance on public 
markets. To calculate this value, I pulled daily share price data from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices’ (CRSP) across my periods of interest for all SPACs included 
in my sample. I used the following equation to calculate share growth: 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 = ln (
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒1
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒0
)  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑖                                          
 Tables IV.7 and IV.8 contain performance data summary statistics for the 365-day 
and 90-day samples respectively. The 365-day price growth rate has a mean value of -32% 
which is far below the S&P 500’s growth which had a CAGR of 12.9% between 2016 and 
2020 (FRED). This clearly reflects the risky nature of SPACs and should be used to caution 
investors trying to capitalize on the media hype. It is important to note, however, that SPAC 
performance has shown strong improvement. The 13 SPACs included in the 365-day 
sample which closed a deal in 2020 had a mean growth rate of 6.1%, highlighting the 
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continued validation of SPACs as a method of reaching public markets. Interestingly, the 
90-day sample’s share price growth has a mean value of -6% up +26 percentage points 
from the 365-day sample. This indicates that public equity markets have historically 
overvalued SPACs shortly after the deal is completed. 
 
 
The enterprise value to trust value ratio has a mean of 412%, highlighting the 
importance of PIPE financing to meet liquidity requirements. As Klausner (2020) 
showcased, 77% of SPACs received a capital infusion through PIPE financing or an 
additional investment from founders during their lifecycle. This additional capital provides 
management vital flexibility during the acquisition phase. The days spent searching for an 
acquisition had a mean value of 602.28 days which satisfies the two-year liquidation 
deadline. A considerable portion of the SPACs included in the sample, however, extended 
far beyond the deadline. In these cases, shareholders voted to extend the SPAC’s charter 
Table IV.7 – Performance Data Summary Statistics – One-Year Sample  
Table IV.8 – Performance Data Summary Statistics – 90-Day Sample  
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allowing it to bypass the liquidation requirements. Redemption rates in the 365-day sample 
had a mean value of 55% which is consistent with Klausner’s (2020) study. After including 
the additional firms from the 90-day sample, the mean falls by 10 percentage points. This 
indicates the growing trust in SPACs from investors as more choose to hold their shares 




IV.2 Model  
 To determine whether there is a significant linear relationship between share price 
growth and the covariates listed above, I ran a multiple variable regression. For each 
variable, I observe characteristics associated with SPAC “i” in year “t”. Prior to running 













2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Figure IV.8 – Average Redemption rates from 2017 through January 2021  
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performed a log transformation on At-Risk Capital to improve linearity between the 
dependent and independent variables such that:  
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐴𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 = ln(𝐴𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐶 𝑖  
Additionally, I created dummy variables using the number of managers, average team age, 
number of underwriters, and days searching variables such that: 
𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 =  {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 ≤ 7
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 > 7
 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 = {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖  ≤ 53.6
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖  > 53.6
 
𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 = {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 ≤ 2
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 > 2
 
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 = {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 ≤ 730
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 > 730
 
I chose seven directors as the Large Board Dummy variable cutoff and 53.6 as the 
Experienced Dummy variable cutoff as they were the median values. Two was chosen as 
the Crowded Underwriter Dummy cutoff because it logically allows for one lead 
underwriter who takes on the most prominent role and a secondary underwriter with less 
responsibility and less of the share of the profits. Finally, 730 days was chosen as the cutoff 
point for the Days Searching Dummy as it naturally splits SPACs who completed their deal 
within the two-year liquidation deadline and those who were forced to extend. To control 
for the time difference fixed effect, I include a year dummy variable for each year and omit 
2016. Running the regression with the four specified dummy variables above results in an 
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R2 0.399 for the one-year sample and was thus chosen as the best fit. The adjusted R2 of 
0.2332 is comparable to Kolb’s (2016) SPAC model which had an adjusted R2 of 0.19.  
V. Results 
 
Table V.1 outlines the regression results for all three samples. The one-year sample 
best represented the data, recording an R-squared of .399. Therefore, interpretations of the 
results are based on the one-year sample with consideration given to the significance and 
sign of the 180-day and 90-day samples. In the following section, I interpret the results 















V.1 Structural SPAC Data 
Trust Value is the net IPO proceeds transferred to the SPAC escrow account. This 
sum along with accrued interest is either used for an acquisition or paid back to investors 
if the shares are redeemed or in the event of a liquidation. Cummings (2014) argues that 
given a higher trust value, the value proposition of any acquisition proposal must be even 
more attractive because the opportunity costs of redeeming shares increases. This implies 
that shareholders demand a higher return on investment in cases where trust value is high. 




Surprisingly, trust value has a significant and negative effect on post-SPAC share price 
performance for both the one-year and 90-day samples. For a one standard deviation 
increase in trust value, there is an expected 0.44 standard deviation decrease in share price 
growth. This reflects Roll’s (1964) argument that smaller firms yield larger average returns 
even after adjusting for risk. Given that trust value is a large determinant of potential target 
company size, it can be inferred that a larger trust value will have a negative effect on 
returns.  
As stated previously, SPACs have no operations or business model that investors 
can evaluate to predict success. Instead, investors base their decisions upon the 
characteristics of the management teams (Cummings 2014). Interestingly, the large board 
dummy variable produced a negative and insignificant sign across all samples. Yermack 
(1996) argues that firms with smaller boards of directors have higher market valuations as 
large boards may struggle with effective communication and decision-making. The 
insignificant sign for the large board variable can be attributed to the immense structural 
differences between SPACs and large corporations. The lack of operational responsibilities 
allows for a far less complex environment where breakdowns in communication can be 
mitigated. 
 Similarly, the experienced variable returned a positive and insignificant sign. 
Experience and institutional knowledge are likely essential to navigate the SPAC market 
and acquire a successful target company; however, Cumming (2014) argues that younger 
managers have not yet achieved comparable wealth to older managers and will thus be 
more motivated to close a deal. These two contrasting effects may explain the lack of 
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significance. While the experience variable was shown to be insignificant, the expertise 
variable returned a positive and significant sign for both the one-year and 180-day samples. 
If a member of a SPAC’s management team has completed one or more SPAC acquisitions, 
there is a resulting 34.9% increase above average returns. The SPAC market is nuanced 
and constantly changing. Having firsthand experience navigating the SPAC lifecycle is 
shown to be instrumental in finding and identifying successful target companies.  
 As stated in the literature review, there has been significant research dedicated to 
the misaligned incentives and dilution caused by the sponsor promote, implying a negative 
impact on post-acquisition share price performance (Klausner 2020). Receiving the 
promote shares is contingent on founders successfully completing a deal. This causes 
severe incentive issues, wherein the sponsor is motivated to complete an acquisition prior 
to the expiration date regardless of the quality of the target firm. Interestingly, the promote 
to IPO shares ratio returned a positive and insignificant sign. The lack of significance can 
likely be explained by the uniformity within the sample. The mean value of promote shares 
to total shares outstanding is 20.3% with only a 1.4% standard deviation in the one-year 
sample. Founders are awarded proportionally similar compensation across most of the 
SPAC population. Therefore, the SPACs within the sample are similarly impacted by the 
sponsor promote, causing it to be insignificant.  
While the promote was shown to be insignificant, at-risk capital returned a positive 
and significant sign for all three samples. A 10% increase in at-risk capital results in a 6.2% 
rise in post-acquisition returns. SPAC founders are heavily incentivized to complete a deal 
prior to their liquidation date due to the enormous payoff that can be achieved through the 
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promote (Jog and Son 2007). These incentives grow even stronger when considering the 
initial at-risk capital supplied by founders to cover overhead and IPO costs (Klausner 
2020). Unlike other shares which can be redeemed from the trust value, at-risk capital is 
void of redemption rights and cannot be recouped in the event of a liquidation. More capital 
from founders should exacerbate the misaligned incentives between founders and public 
shareholders. On the other hand, at-risk capital is exchanged for shares and warrants of the 
SPAC and will thus force additional “skin-in the game” for founders. Founder payoff 
becomes increasingly tied to post-acquisition performance as pools of at-risk capital grow 
larger, explaining the positive and significant coefficient. 
 
V.2 IPO Process Data 
The crowded underwriter dummy variable returns a negative and significant 
coefficient for the one-year sample. Wilson (1968) proposes the idea that syndicates are 
formed in cases where risk-sharing is needed. Instead of taking on the entire risk for a 
particular SPAC, IPO investors choose to share it and split the subsequent payoff or losses. 
Therefore, an increase in underwriters can be viewed as a lack of trust in SPAC 
management from 13F filers. Additionally, SPAC management must balance challenges 
derived from communicating with multiple stakeholders with differing risk tolerances. 
This can slow efficiency and cause decision making problems. If a SPAC is underwritten 
by three or more institutions, it results in a decline of 41% from the average return.  
The highest ranked underwriter variable returns a positive and significant 
coefficient for the one-year sample. Intuitively, underwriters with a higher bookrunner 
volume are more experienced and knowledgeable of the SPAC market. Additional 
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expertise from underwriters is proven to be valuable during the searching and acquisition 
phase of a SPAC’s lifecycle. For one increase in rank for a SPAC’s highest ranked 
underwriter, there is an expected 6.6% increase in returns. Surprisingly, average 
underwriter ranking results in a negative and significant coefficient for the one-year and 
180-day samples. Each increase in rank results in an expected 6.6% increase in returns. It 
appears that SPACs benefits from having a disparity in underwriter ranking. Having a clear 
underwriting authority may mitigate the negative effects caused by having a crowded 
underwriting table.  
It is important to note that the crowded dummy, highest ranked underwriter, and 
average underwriter rank covariates all returned significant signs for the one-year sample; 
however, they all proved insignificant in the 90-day regression. This is likely due to the 
additional observations added to the sample from the end of 2020 and beginning of 2021. 
By extending the sample period, the 90-day regression can more closely capture the effect 
of the explosion in SPAC popularity seen in 2020. As a byproduct of the growth of SPACs, 
a wave of institutional investors entered the SPAC market for the first time. In 2020, there 
was a total of 41 active underwriters up 42% from 2019. This growth of institutional 
investors reflects the continued legitimization of special purpose acquisition companies 
and can explain the decreased need for risk sharing amongst underwriters. Additionally, 
increased competition amongst underwriters and the subsequent increase in optionality for 




V.3 Performance Data 
 
The enterprise value to trust value interaction term is shown to have a positive and 
significant sign with a 10-percentage point increase resulting in an expected 0.63% increase 
in share price. These results can be interpreted in several different ways. First, it can be 
inferred that the ratio between enterprise value and trust value showcases management’s 
ability to strike a favorable deal for shareholders. It also provides further insight into the 
effect of capital infusions during the SPAC lifecycle. In cases where trust values fall below 
the required level of cash to complete a deal, SPACs have relied heavily on PIPE 
investments to replenish redeemed capital and finalize mergers. These findings 
demonstrate that PIPE financing affords management the flexibility to find and negotiate 
more promising deals for shareholders.   
Redemption Rate returned a negative and statistically significant sign for all three 
regressions, contradicting past research. Klausner (2020) argued that institutional 
investors, who hold most of the public shares throughout a given SPACs life, are motivated 
to divest their shares regardless of the potential quality of the target firm, minimizing the 
insights derived from share redemptions. The data, however, shows that share redemptions 
provide clear insight into post acquisition performance. Klausner focused his research on 
SPACs which merged from 2019 through mid-2020 cohort, but significant changes have 
been made since that point in time. As stated in the data section, average redemption rate 
has fallen considerably since its high in 2018. This highlights the legitimization of the 




The Days Searching Dummy coefficient proved to be statistically insignificant and 
positive. As Jog and Son (2007) argued and later research confirmed, SPAC founders are 
heavily incentivized to complete a deal prior to the liquidation date regardless of the quality 
of the target firm. As time passes in theory, pressure to acquire a firm quickly continues to 
mount for management. If a SPAC is unable to find a suitable acquisition target earlier in 
its lifecycle, it becomes increasing unlikely that one will surface as the deadline looms 
closer. Therefore, SPAC managers approaching the liquidation date should be incentivized 
to push through riskier and less profitable acquisitions. Interestingly, the data does not 
support this theory. The ability to circumvent the liquidation deadline by holding a 




This paper attempts to identify key SPAC characteristics that translate to post-
acquisition share price growth. The data I employ includes structural data, IPO process 
data, and key performance metrics measured throughout the SPAC’s life. My study on the 
determinants of post-acquisition success provides new and robust results which can be 
employed by investors evaluating the SPAC market and for future studies.  
First, this paper reveals new findings on founder compensation, contradicting past 
research. As discussed in the results section, at-risk capital was found to have a positive 
and significant effect on share price growth in all three regressions despite the introduction 
of potentially misaligned incentives. While there may still be concerns about founders 
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promoting risky acquisitions to avoid losing their investment, additional at-risk capital 
increases the tie between founder compensation and post-acquisition performance. 
Applying this finding, shareholders should view high levels of at-risk capital as an indicator 
of founder commitment.  
 Second, I find evidence that underwriter characteristics are declining in importance 
as a determinant for post-acquisition success. All three underwriter variables proved to be 
significant in the one-year regression but were insignificant in the 90-day sample which 
extends through January of 2021. The lack of significance in the 90-day sample reflects 
rapidly changing market sentiments throughout 2020 which saw a wave of institutional 
investors entering the SPAC market for the first time. SPAC founders now have 
unprecedented optionality on who they plan to work with, and the results suggest that there 
is no clear underwriter archetype which provides the strongest results. Therefore, 
shareholders should not place excessive weight upon underwriter characteristics when 
making investment decisions. 
Third, share redemption rates are shown to have a key significant effect on post-
acquisition share price growth for all three regressions. This result was to be expected but 
was not certain given the high redemption rates seen across the majority of the SPAC 
population. Additionally, Klausner’s (2020) argument suggested that most shareholders are 
incentivized to divest their shares regardless of the quality of the target firm. My data, 
however, confirms the significant association between share redemptions and share price 
growth which can be applied by investors observing the SPAC market. 
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This study was undertaken during a period of enormous growth and change for the 
SPAC market, leaving significant room for future studies to build from as the SPAC market 
continues to mature. Most notably, exploring the effect of the sponsor promote on share 
price growth several years from now has the potential for robust and new findings. As 
mentioned previously, the sponsor promote was largely uniform across the entire 
population, resulting in a positive and insignificant effect in my regression. This is likely 
to change, as SPACs continue to saturate the market and compete over the highest potential 
firms. Successful SPACs will likely reduce the amount of promote shares awarded to 
founders in exchange for higher potential returns post-acquisition. Some SPAC founders 
have shown a willingness to adopt this strategy. Hedge fund billionaire, William Ackman, 
founded Pershing Square Tontine Holdings (PSTH) and raised capital through an IPO in 
July of 2020. Ackman decided to abandon the industry standard and completely removed 
the promote from the SPAC structure. As more founders are forced to follow Ackman’s 
lead, empirical analysis on the effect of the sponsor promote could be eye-opening.  
The SPAC has dominated headlines throughout 2020 and through the start of 2021; 
however, a consensus between commentators is seemingly out of reach. Some argue that 
the SPAC boom is a bubble that is sure to come crashing down while others claim SPACs 
will never relinquish their crown back to the traditional IPO. Serious question marks 
remain about their long-term prospects, but it does not appear like there is an end in sight 
to this new era of SPACs. SPACs have seemingly become entrenched in public equity 
markets and it is increasingly important for investors to educate themselves. By following 
and understanding the above results, investors will maximize their preparedness for 
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